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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Land tenure security is important to encourage investment in land improvements as 
well as the development of efficient land markets. In Ethiopia, empirical analysis is 
required to find out the effect of the current land tenure system on farmers’ propensity to 
invest in land improvements, and the development and functioning of land markets. Data 
collected from 50 communities in the highlands of Tigray in 1998 was used to 
investigate the functioning of land markets, and determine the relationship between 
perceived land tenure security and land investments in the region. We found out that 
informal land markets (sharecropping and fixed rental) are emerging in the region, and 
while quality of land is an important determinant of rental price in fixed lease, quality 
appears to play limited role in determining the land holder’s share in sharecropping. 
Landlessness is increasing in the region. Perceived tenure security is important for 
making land investments and use of improved farming practices. However, investments 
in land doest not appear to have significant effect on perceived tenure security of 
farmers. Our results imply that there is a need to improve tenure security of farmers in 
order to encourage land investment. The role of  public policy in facilitating the 
development of the fledgling land markets needs to be explored. The wishes and 
preferences of farmers regarding land tenure arrangements and land administration 
should be considered as crucial inputs to future land tenure arrangements. Moreover, an 
open, concerted and inclusive debate on the relevance and feasibility of alternative land 
tenure arrangements for the country or for different parts of the country needs to be 
encouraged. Alternative tenure arrangements need to be evaluated based on the level of 
security they provide to farmers, since tenure security is more important than the mode 
of ownership. 
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Land Tenure and Land Management in the Highlands of Northern Ethiopia 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Significant improvements in agricultural productivity are crucial to addressing the 
worsening conditions of poverty and food security in sub-Saharan Africa (Omiti et al., 
2000). In Ethiopia, improvement in land productivity is vital to enhance and sustain the 
welfare of the largely agrarian population (World Bank, 1989). The traditional land use 
and land management practices that used to sustain the welfare of human population 
under low population pressure with little or no technical inputs is no longer able to 
support the growing population. Due to increasing population density and degradation of 
the natural resource base, declining per capita food production results in deteriorating 
human welfare conditions.   
Improvements in agricultural productivity in Ethiopia will require a more efficient 
use of rural resources, especially land, labor and traction power, since these resources are 
the major inputs into agricultural production in the country. Improvements in the 
performance of agriculture will, therefore, depend considerably on how well the 
constraints of the functioning of markets for these key factors of production is addressed 
(Omiti, 2000).  
Increasing population results in land scarcity and, when alternative employment 
opportunities outside agriculture are limited, may eventually lead to landlessness. Under 
this situation, well functioning land markets may result in welfare gain by allocating the 
land resource to more efficient users and by permitting land consolidation to achieve 
economies of size. For example, Holden et al. (2001) concluded that improvement in the 
labor and land rental markets in the Ethiopian highlands might reduce inefficiency in the 
agricultural sector. Similarly, in Coastal China, improvements in land markets and 
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associated institutions were found to be a major contributor to higher allocative 
efficiency (Yao, 1996).  
However, for land markets to function efficiently, low transaction costs and tenure 
security are essential. Land tenure security is important not only for the development of 
efficient land markets, but also for investment in land improvements. For example, 
Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003) found that farmers’ perceived land tenure security in 
Tigray, northern Ethiopia, was significantly and positively associated with long-term 
durable soil conservation investments such as stone terraces. Similarly, Feder and 
Onchan (1987) found in Thailand that ownership security was significant in explaining 
the incidence of land improvements. The findings of Pender and Kerr (1998) in India 
also suggest that improvements in land markets would increase conservation investments 
on farm land.  
Efficient use of the land resource also requires access to agricultural inputs such as 
farm labor, traction power and farm implements. At peak periods of agricultural 
activities, traction constraint (eg. for land preparation) or labour constraint (eg. for 
weeding, harvesting) may result in low land productivity. Efficient labour and traction 
markets may, therefore, contribute to welfare gains by allocating these resources to their 
best use.  However, in the absence of institutional support, markets for agricultural land, 
farm labor and traction are unlikely to develop and operate efficiently. The development 
of agricultural factor markets need broad and committed public intervention. For 
example, Bruce and Migot-Adholla  (1994) posit that even in free market systems, 
further incentives in addition to security are required to encourage land sales and rental 
markets.    
In Ethiopia, after almost two decades of socialist oriented economic policy under 
the military regime, the current Ethiopian Government has been taking measures to 
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liberalize the economy since 1991. In the agricultural sector, measures to liberalize the 
input and output markets and increase institutional support for agriculture, such as 
agricultural research and extension services, have been taken. In the regions of Tigray 
and Amhara, land titling aimed at improving farmers’ land tenure security has also been 
implemented. The titling process provides certificates of holding but do not bestow 
ownership since, constitutionally, land belongs to the state.  
The long-term impact of the measures taken by the government to improve 
agricultural production will depend on their effect on the structure and stability of 
economic incentives available to farmers. Whether or not government policies are 
conducive to investment in agriculture and whether the incentive structure translates into 
a more sustainable use of the natural resource base is an empirical question.  
This paper is intended to assess the land use and land tenure situation in the 
northern Ethiopian region of Tigray since 1991 and investigate the effect of land tenure 
security on land management. Descriptive analysis and econometric analysis of data 
collected from 50 tabias1 (communities) and 100 villages in 1998 are used. We find that 
an informal land market (leasing and sharecropping) is emerging in Tigray, and while the 
quality of land is an important determinant of rental price in fixed lease, quality appears 
to play limited role in determining land holder’s share in share cropping. Landlessness is 
increasing in the region. Perceived tenure security is important for investments in land 
improvements, and use of improved farming practices. However, land investments do not 
appear to have significant effect on perceived tenure security of farmers.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the data and results of 
analysis of descriptive information. Section three deals with the empirical approach, 
                                                 
1 Tabia is the lowest administrative unit in Tigray usually comprising of four to five villages. 
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while section four presents results of the econometric analysis. The last section presents 
conclusions and implications of results.  
 
  
2. Data 
  The analysis in this paper is based on community level data collected from 50 
tabias
2
  and 100 villages in the highlands of the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia 
during 1998/99. Sample tabias were selected following random sampling stratified by 
distance to the nearest town and presence of irrigation project. Two villages were 
randomly chosen from the selected tabias. A semi-structured questionnaire was 
administered with a group of representative individuals both at the tabia and village 
levels. Each interview group comprised of ten respondents chosen to represent different 
age groups, primary occupations, gender and villages. Information was collected on 
changes in agricultural and resource conditions between 1991 and 1998, and their causes 
and impacts.  
 
Land use and land tenure 
In Tigray, the dominant land tenure systems for rainfed cultivated and irrigated land 
are owner used and sharecropped, with limited use of fixed lease and borrowing. 
Homesteads are mostly owner used with limited use of fixed lease. However, homesteads 
are not sharecropped. Few tabias reported the existence of private pasture. Irrigated land 
appears to be more prevalent in more densely3 populated areas. In 1998 35% of tabias 
with low population density and 86% of tabias with high population density reported 
owner used irrigated lands.  The results for 1991 are also similar, with 35% of tabias of 
                                                 
2
  Ttabia is the lowest administrative unit in the region and usually consists of four to five villages. 
3 Tabias  were classified as high population density if they had more than 100 people per km2. 
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low population density and 79% of tabias with high population density reporting owner 
used irrigated lands.  
 The number of landless households in Tigray is increasing. According to 
respondents, the average number of landless households per Tabia in 1991 was 104. This 
figure grew to 264 in 1998, an increase of  140% (Table 1). The pattern of landlessness 
appears to show marked difference by population density and market access4. 
Landlessness is higher in low population density and low market access areas.  
 Several land acquisition methods are used in Tigray. These include distribution, 
sharecropping, fixed lease, borrowing, inheritance and “accommodation”5.  However, 
there have been changes in the importance of these means of land acquisition in the 
region between 1991 and 1998 (Table 2). While the use of fixed lease appears to be 
increasing, the use of distribution, “accommodation”, and inheritance are decreasing. 
Sharecropping arrangements also appear to be shifting towards equal share between the 
owner and the leaseholder. However, the use of borrowing showed no change. A 
household level analysis in south central Tigray showed that land transfer through 
leasing or sharecropping was higher in high altitude areas and with female headed 
households (Gebremedhin,1998). 
 The quality of land appears to determine the rental price of land. In 1998, the average 
rental price per ha for land with fixed lease was Birr6 450, 550, and 845 for poor, 
medium and good quality land, respectively (Table 3). The rental price also appears to 
show marked difference by population density and market access. Rental prices tend to 
be higher in high population density areas. However, rental prices surprisingly seem to 
be higher in low market access areas. 
                                                 
4 Tabias were classified as high market access if they are within 1o km distance from the nearest town. 
5 “Accommodation”, locally called “Mishigishag” is an institution where a landless household is allotted land 
from communal land or from households who are believed to have larger land, without making a major land 
distribution in the community.  
6
 In 1998, 7.02 Birr= 1 US $.  
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 Under share tenancy, the land holder receives on average about a half of the grain, 
and about 15% of the straw or crop residue in 1998 (Table 4). Land holders’ share of 
grain and straw does not appear to be influenced by differences in land quality, nor by 
population density or market access, consistent with the standard theory about 
sharecropping being a balance between incentive problems in wage contracts and risk 
pooling advantage of sharecropping. Under share cropping arrangements, land holders 
contribute to labor, seed and fertilizer costs, although traction and equipment costs are 
entirely covered by the leaseholder. On average, land owners contributed about 10% of 
labor cost, 16% of seed cost and 5% of fertilizer cost in 1998 (Table 5). The proportion 
of labor cost covered by the land owner seems to be higher in low market access areas 
(than high market access areas).  
 The average duration of contract for both sharecropping and fixed lease arrangements 
appears to be two years, and seems to be independent of the type of crop planted by the 
leaseholder, population density and market access (Table 6). The likelihood of renewal 
of lease or sharecropping contracts is not affected by the type of crop planted, or 
investment in soil and water conservation and tree planting (Table 7). This suggests that 
lease and sharecropping contracts in the region do not provide incentive to leaseholders 
to invest in land improvement measures.     
 Farmers in Tigray do not perceive that their land tenure security can be enhanced by 
their investments in the land, such as investing in soil and water conservation practices, 
planting trees, clearing the land or building fences (Table 8). These perceptions appear to 
be unaffected by differences in population density or market access. However, land 
tenure security has a significant perceived impact on the incentive of farmers to invest in 
land improvements (Table 9). Land tenure security affects significantly farmers’ 
incentives to invest in constructing soil and water conservation practices, building 
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fences, and planting trees.  Tenure security also appears to affect likelihood of fallowing 
land for more than a year. The effect of tenure security on farmer incentives to invest in 
land improvements appears to be consistent across population density or market access 
conditions.    
 
3. Empirical Approach 
 Our primary focus in this paper is to determine if farmers’ perceived land tenure 
affects investments in land improvement and use of improved farming practices that 
maintain soil fertility, after controlling for other factors that could affect land investment and 
improved land use. The analysis aims to test the general hypothesis that perceived tenure 
security will enhance investments on land and use of improved farming practices.  
We use proportion of households in Tabia who made private investments in stone 
terraces, tree planting and soil bunds between 1991 and 1998 as indicators of investment in 
land. We use changes in proportion of households who use fallowing for more than a year 
and composting between 1991 and 1998 as indicators of improved farming practices that 
maintain or enhance soil fertility. Stone terraces and tree planting are durable long-term 
investments, the returns of which may take several years in the future. Hence, farmers’ 
incentives to invest in these practices is expected to be dependent on perceived land tenure 
security. Soil bunds are low cost, medium-term investments, but tenure security is still 
important for investment decisions since returns accrue in the future. Fallowing and 
composting are expected to improve soil fertility. However, farmers with low tenure security 
may not opt to fallow their land or use compost as they may not be certain of cultivating the 
same land the next cropping seasons. 
 We use seven indicators of tenure security. These include number of land 
distributions in tabia since 1974, number of years since last land distribution in tabia, 
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number of landless households in tabia in 1991 and change in number of landless 
households between 1991 and 1998, if community members felt very or moderately secure 
in their land tenure in 1991 (as opposed to very or moderately insecure), if tenure security 
perception of community members improved moderately between 1991 and 1998 (as 
opposed to no change), and if tenure security perception of community members improved 
significantly between 1991 and 1998 (as opposed to no change).  
We expect that the frequency of land distributions in the community will be 
associated with less tenure security, and thus less investment on the land or use of improved 
land management practices. Number of years since last land distribution is expected to 
enhance tenure security and thus investment, since it is an indicator of stability of tenure in 
the region, after controlling for other indicators of tenure security. The number of landless 
households in 1991 and the change in the number of landless households are expected to be 
associated with less tenure security, since the higher the number of landless households, the 
higher will be community expectations for land redistribution to take place. The survey also 
solicited directly community perceptions of tenure security in 1991 and 1998. Community 
perceptions of tenure security in 1991 was solicited in ordinal terms (very insecure, 
moderately insecure, moderately secure, and very secure). A dummy variable was 
constructed from the ordinal responses (1=very or moderately secure, 0=very or moderately 
insecure). Community perceptions of change in their tenure security in 1998  (cf. 1991) was 
solicited in ordinal terms (deteriorated significantly, deteriorated moderately, no change, 
improved moderately, and improved significantly). Since perceived tenure security either 
remained the same or improved in the sample communities, two dummy variables were 
constructed from the ordinal responses (1= improved moderately, 0=no change; and 
1=improved significantly, 0=no change).  
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In order to isolate the effect of these tenure security variables on land investment and 
improved farming practices, we controlled for indicators of agricultural potential (annual 
precipitation and average elevation), and market access. We also controlled for changes in 
literacy in village between 1991 and 1998. We included zonal dummies to control for zone 
specific factors that may have bearing on land tenure, such as differences in land 
administration and community involvement in land related issues.   
The econometric model is given by: 
Yv2 – yv1 = a2 – a1 + b(xv2 – xv1) + (c2 – c1)zv + ev2 – ev1 
Where yvt is the proportion of households in village v who invested in land or used improved 
farming practices in year t, xvt is a vector of time varying factors affecting land investment or 
use of improved practices, zv is a vector of observed fixed factors affecting land investment 
or use of farm practices, and evt are unobserved time varying factors. This first difference 
model eliminates unobservable fixed factors as a source of omitted variable bias. The 
observable fixed factors (zv) will have effect only if their marginal impact has changed over 
time.    
 Perceived tenure security variables may also be endogenous to land investment, since 
farmers may feel that their tenure security can be influenced by their land management 
decisions, especially long-term investments. Analysis of descriptive information showed that 
farmers in the study area do not believe that their land investment decisions do influence 
their tenure security. This result was also confirmed by an exogeneity test using Hausman’s 
test (Hausman, 1978).  
 We use maximum likelihood two-limit Tobit to estimate the equations for the 
changes in the proportion of households who invested in stone terraces, tree planting, and 
soil bunds, since these variables are censored from both sides. We use ordinary least squares 
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(OLS) to estimate the equations for the changes in proportion of households using fallowing 
and composting since theses variables were continuous.   
 
 
5. Results 
 Results of the determinants of land investments are given in Table 10. Three of the 
seven tenure security variables in the case of investment in stone terraces, and two of them in 
the case of tree planting are significant with the expected signs, supporting the general 
hypotheses that tenure security is important for land investment. In the case of investment in 
soil bunds, two of the tenure security variables are significant with one having the expected 
sign.  
The duration since last land distribution in tabia is associated with higher 
investments in stone terraces, as expected, but failed to influence investments in tree planting 
or soil bunds. Number of landless households in 1991 and change (increase) in number of 
landless households between 1998 and 1991 are associated with less investment in stone 
terraces. When the number of landless households increases, the expectation of communities 
for a redistribution of land to occur increases thus reducing the tenure security perception of 
landed households. However, number of landless households in 1991 is associated with 
investment in soil bunds. It could be that farmers with less tenure security resort more to 
investing in soil bunds, practices that are low cost and medium-term soil and water 
conservation investments. Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003) found that tenure security is 
more important for investment in durable long-term investments such as stone terraces, than 
for short-term low cost investments such as soil bunds. 
Communities which felt secure about their land tenure in 1991 and communities 
whose tenure security perception improved significantly between 1991 and 1998 invest more 
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in tree planting than those who felt insecure in 1991 and those whose tenure security 
perception remained the same between 1991 and 1998.  Moreover, moderate improvement in 
tenure security is also associated with increased investment in soil bunds.  
We also find that investment in stone terraces is higher in higher altitude areas, and in 
areas where literacy is higher. Literacy, as a means of access to written information, may 
raise the awareness of households regarding the availability and importance of land 
investments, and improve efficiency of farm operations. Investment in soil bunds is less in 
areas of higher rainfall, perhaps because of water logging problems, but higher in higher 
elevation. Area of tabia decreased investment in soil bunds. However, investment in soil 
bunds is higher in higher altitude areas. 
The results of the regression estimates for fallowing and composting also support the 
general hypotheses that tenure security is important for improved farming practices that 
would have a carry-over effect in soil fertility (Table 11). Secure land tenure perception of 
communities in 1991 is associated with higher fallowing, as expected. Increases in number 
of landless households in tabia is also associated with reduced fallowing. Moderate or 
significant improvements in perceived tenure security is associated with higher use of 
composting. However, contrary to expectations, we find that moderate improvement in land 
tenure security is associated with reduced fallowing.  Fallowing is higher in higher altitude 
areas, and in areas closer to market places. There is more use of fallowing in the eastern zone 
compared to the southern zone, and more use of composting in the central zone compared to 
the southern zone. 
One of the reasons that the explanatory variables may be insignificant is if there is a 
high colinearity among the variables. We tested for multicillearity and found that it is not a 
problem in the data set. The maximum variance inflation factor we found is 8, and most 
variables have variance inflation factors of less than 5.  
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6. Conclusions and Implications 
 According to survey respondents, landlessness is increasing in the Tigray region. 
Between 1991 and 1998, the number of landless households per tabia grew by more than 
140%. Informal land transaction are operating in the region, including sharecropping, fixed 
lease paid in cash or in kind, and borrowing. The use of fixed lease as a means of land 
acquisition, although very low, appears to be increasing, and sharecropping arrangements 
seem to be shifting towards equal share between the landholder and the leaseholder. While 
the rental price of land seems to depend on the quality of land, sharecropping ratios appear to 
be independent of the quality of land.  
While land owners cover part of labour, seed and fertilizer costs in sharecropping 
arrangements, traction and equipment costs are entirely covered by the shareholders. The 
average terms of sharecropping and fixed lease is about two years, and is not influenced by 
the type of crop planted. Likelihood of renewal of sharecropping or lease contracts is not 
affected by the type of crop planted or land investment by the tenant. Farmers reported that 
while tenure security is highly likely to affect farmer incentives to invest in land, farmers 
own land investment is unlikely to affect tenure security. Irrigated land appears to be 
concentrated in high population density areas.  
Econometric analysis of the effect of tenure security on land investments and use of 
improved farming practices show that tenure security is an important determinant of farmers 
incentives to invest in land and use improved farming practices. Stability of tenure 
encourages investment in stone terraces, while tenure insecurity due to higher number of 
landless households detracts from it. Moderate improvements in perceived tenure security 
results in higher investment in soil bunds. Significant improvements in tenure security is 
important for investment in tree plantation.  
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Our results imply that improving tenure security is important for improved land 
management in the region. The land titling that took place in Tigray, coupled with the 
regional legislation that prohibits further land redistribution, is an important step in this 
direction. However, legal support of farmers’ use rights in perpetuity, their right for 
compensation of land investment in case of special-circumstance land redistributions, and 
the right to bequeath land to children could strengthen tenure security.  
Our results also imply that the potential roles of public policy to facilitate the 
development of the fledgling land market needs to be explored. Moreover, restrictions on 
land exchange, such as those which limit land transactions to two years, may need to be 
revisited. The wishes and preferences of farmers regarding land tenure arrangements and 
land administration should be considered as an important and crucial input in to the design of 
future tenure arrangements in the region. 
An open, concerted and inclusive debate on the relevance and feasibility of 
alternative land tenure systems for the country or different parts of the country needs to be 
encouraged. The debate on land tenure should broader than being fixated on the state/public 
versus private ownership dichotomy, since these are only two polar end points of a 
continuum of several possible tenure arrangements. Each potential land tenure system needs 
to be evaluated in terms of its effect on the tenure security it provides to farmers, since 
security is more important than the mode of ownership. 
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  Table 1: Number of Land Less Households in Tabia by Population Density 
 and Market Access 
 
Population Density Market Access  
Year 
 
Average Low High Low High 
 
1991 
 
104 
 
196 
 
64 
 
115 
 
63 
 
1998 
 
267 
 
318 
 
251 
 
277 
 
232 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Change in Methods of Land Acquisition ( 1991 – 1998) by 
Population Density and Market Access* 
 
Population Density Market Access  
 
Means of 
acquisition 
 
 
Average 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Inheritance 
 
2 
 
1.59 
 
2.32 
 
2 
 
2 
 
Distribution 
 
2.12 
 
1.86 
 
2.28 
 
2.01 
 
2.55 
 
“Accommodation” 
 
1.61 
 
1.61 
 
1.61 
 
1.66 
 
1.39 
 
Fixed Lease 
 
3.86 
 
3.88 
 
3.84 
 
3.94 
 
3.63 
 
Sharecropping(1/2) 
 
3.3 
 
3.58 
 
3.25 
 
3.34 
 
3.17 
 
Sharecropping(1/3) 
 
3.2 
 
3.67 
 
2.76 
 
3.16 
 
3.54 
 
Sharecropping(1/4) 
 
2.58 
 
2.64 
 
1.75 
 
2.62 
 
2 
 
Borrowing 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
No obs 
 * 1 = major decrease, 2 = minor decrease , 3 = no change, 4 = minor increase  
5 = major increase 
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Table3: Average Rental Price in 1998 for Fixed Rental by Soil Quality, 
Population Density and Market Access (Birr/ha) 
 
Population Density Market Access  
Soil Type 
 
Average Low High Low High 
 
Poor Soil 
 
450 
 
--- 
 
450 
 
577 
 
320 
 
Medium Soil 
 
550 
 
315 
 
709 
 
604 
 
452 
 
Good Soil 
 
845 
 
400 
 
972 
 
906 
 
746 
 
 
 
Table 4: Land Holders Share under Share Tenancy by Population Density 
and Market Access (1998) 
 
Population Density Market Access  
Out put 
 
Soil Type 
 
Average Low High Low High 
 
Poor Soil 
 
0.43 
 
0.33 
 
0.47 
 
0.42 
 
0.45 
 
Medium Soil 
 
0.44 
 
0.32 
 
0.50 
 
0.43 
 
0.48 
 
 
Grain 
 
Good Soil 
 
0.45 
 
0.35 
 
0.50 
 
0.44 
 
0.49 
 
Poor Soil 
 
0.14 
 
0.09 
 
0.13 
 
0.12 
 
0.18 
 
Medium Soil 
 
0.13 
 
0.11 
 
0.14 
 
0.11 
 
0.19 
 
 
Straw/Crop 
Residue 
 
Good Soil 
 
0.14 
 
0.14 
 
0.14 
 
0.12 
 
0.18 
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Table 5: Land Holder’s Share of Cost Under Share Tenancy by Population 
Density and Market Access (1998) 
 
Population Density Market Access  
Cost 
 
Average Low High Low High 
 
Labor 
 
0.1 
 
0.11 
 
0.1 
 
0.11 
 
0.04 
 
Seed 
 
0.16 
 
0.06 
 
0.22 
 
0.08 
 
0.11 
 
Fertilizer 
 
0.05 
 
0.09 
 
0.03 
 
0.06 
 
0.03 
 
Oxen 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Equipment 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Average Duration (years) of Contract by Population Density and Market 
Access (1998) 
 
Population Density Market Access  
Land Tenure 
 
Crop Type 
 
Average Low High Low High 
 
Teff 
 
1.73 
 
1.69 
 
1.77 
 
1.68 
 
1.81 
 
Legumes 
 
1.69 
 
1.62 
 
1.77 
 
1.68 
 
1.70 
 
 
 
Fixed Rental 
 
Other 
Crops 
 
1.61 
 
1.60 
 
1.63 
 
1.59 
 
1.66 
 
Teff 
 
1.98 
 
2.10 
 
1.93 
 
2 
 
1.92 
 
Legumes 
 
1.90 
 
1.95 
 
1.87 
 
1.90 
 
1.89 
 
 
Share Tenancy 
Other 
Crops 
 
1.94 
 
2.06 
 
1.88 
 
1.94 
 
1.91 
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Table 7:  Factors Affecting Likelihood of Renewal or Extension of Land Lease or 
Share Cropping Arrangement by Population Density and Market 
Access* 
 
Population Density Market Access  
 
 
Factors 
 
Average Low High Low High 
 
Plant Teff 
 
3.06 
 
3 
 
3.09 
 
3.08 
 
3 
Plant Legumes  
3.12 
 
3 
 
3.19 
 
3.16 
 
3 
 
Use Manure 
 
3.14 
 
3.1 
 
3.16 
 
3.16 
 
3.05 
 
Invest in SWC 
 
3.15 
 
3.1 
 
3.19 
 
3.20 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
Tenant 
 
Plant Trees 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
Invest in SWC 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
Owner 
 
Plant Trees 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
   * 1=reduces significantly, 2= reduces slightly, 3=no effect, 4= increases slightly,  
      5= increases significantly 
 
 
Table 8:   Factors Affecting Land Tenure Security by Population Density and 
Market Access* 
 
Population Density Market Access  
Factors 
 
Year 
 
Average Low High Low High 
1991 3.06 3.04 3.08 3.06 3.06  
Building Fences 1998 3.36 3.54 3.29 3.41 3.17 
1991 3.07 3.05 3.09 3.08 3.05  
Planting Trees 1998 3.35 3.61 3.24 3.38 3.23 
1991 3.10 3.25 3.04 3.11 3.06  
Cutting Trees 1998 2.95 2.73 3.05 2.93 3.06 
1991 3.06 3.09 3.05 3.07 3.05  
Clearing Land 1998 3.08 3.08 3.09 3.04 3.23 
1991 3.14 3.24 3.11 3.14 3.16 Constructing or 
Maintaining SWC 1998 3.16 3.12 3.18 3.12 3.27 
1991 2.94 3 2.90 2.92 3  
Leaving Land Fallow 1998 3.12 3 3.18 3.11 3.16 
1991 3.15 3.24 3.12 3.14 3.21  
Constructing a House 1998 3.08 3.31 2.97 3.10 3 
*1 = decrease substantially, 2 = decrease slightly, 3 = no effect, 4 = increase slightly  
5 = increase substantially  
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Table9: Factors Affected by Tenure Security by Population Density and Market 
Access* (1998) 
 
Population Density Market Access  
Factors 
 
Average Low High Low High 
 
Building Fence 
 
4.96 
 
4.9 
 
4.98 
 
4.96 
 
4.94 
 
Planting Trees 
 
4.83 
 
4.9 
 
4.79 
 
4.80 
 
4.94 
 
Cutting Trees 
 
3.13 
 
2.46 
 
3.40 
 
3.16 
 
2.98 
 
Clearing Land 
 
4.49 
 
4.62 
 
4.46 
 
4.45 
 
4.69 
Constructing or 
Maintaining SWC 
 
4.70 
 
4.70 
 
4.7 
 
4.64 
 
4.94 
 
Leaving Land Fallow 
 
4.46 
 
4.46 
 
4.42 
 
4.5 
 
4.30 
 
Constructing a House 
 
3.73 
 
3.66 
 
3.75 
 
3.72 
 
3.76 
 
Reside outside of Tabia 
 
3.77 
 
3.90 
 
3.71 
 
3.88 
 
3.34 
*1 = decrease substantially, 2 = decrease slightly, 3 = no effect, 4 = increase slightly  
5 = increase substantially 
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Table 10:  Determinants of land investments in the highlands of Tigray1 
 
 
Variable 
Stone 
Terrace 
(Tobit2) 
Tree 
Planting 
(Tobit2) 
Soil Bund 
(Tobit2) 
Number of land distribution since 1974 0.01540 0.04374 -0.03698 
Number of years since last land distribution in 
Tabia 
  
0.02663** 
  
0.01294 
 
-0.02486 
Number of landless households in Tabia in 1991 -0.00053**  0.00048 0.00211*** 
Change in number of landless households (1991 – 
1998) 
 
-0.00073*** 
  
0.00004 
 
-0.00081 
If community felt very or moderately secure in 
1991 
  
 0.15732 
  
 0.68895** 
 
0.14717 
If land tenure security improved significantly 
(1998 – 1991) 
 
-0.06490 
 
0.74333*** 
 
0.081103 
If land tenure security improved moderately (1998 
– 1991) 
  
-0.06330 
 
-0.24963 
 
0.35504** 
Average elevation (meters)  0.00042* -0.00169 0.00003 
Average annual precipitation (mm)  0.00062  0.00169 -0.00275** 
Change in proportion of households who are 
literate (1998 – 1991) 
 
0.47635** 
 
-0.76777 
 
0.27268 
Distance to market (walking minutes) 0.00018 0.00047 -0.00057 
Central Zone (cf. South Zone) 0.18188 0.31770 0.19013 
East Zone (cf. South Zone) 0.05512 0.41756 0.05169 
West Zone (cf. South Zone) 0.21141 0.32152 0.27355 
Area of tabia 0.00164 0.00197 -0.00454** 
Constant -1.3333 -2.5143 1.79430 
Number of observations 91 88 91 
F 3.55 2.25 3.38 
Prob > F 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
1 All regression results are corrected for sampling stratification and weights, and standard 
errors are robust to hetroskedasticity and non-independence within the primary sampling 
units. 
2 Survey Interval Regression was used to estimate the two-limit maximum likelihood Tobit 
models. 
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Table 11:  Determinants of use of improved farming practices in the highlands of 
Tigray
1 
 
 
Variable 
 
Fallowing 
(OLS) 
 
Composting 
(OLS) 
Number of land distribution since 1974 -0.00201  0.03516 
Number of years since last land distribution in Tabia  0.00766  0.00315 
Number of landless households in Tabia in 1991  0.00001  0.00012 
Change in number of landless households 1991 - 1998 -0.00025** -0.00002 
If community felt very or moderately secure in 1991  0.11073*  0.08529 
If land tenure security improved significantly (1998 – 1991)  0.00382  0.21856* 
If land tenure security improved moderately (1998 – 1991) -0.09674**  0.20113*** 
Average elevation  0.00017***  0.00008 
Average annual precipitation  0.00022 -0.00004 
Change in proportion of households literate (1998 – 1991)  0.00023  0.05844 
Distance to market -0.00023** -0.00016 
Central Zone (cf. South Zone)  0.01583  0.13834** 
East Zone (cf. South Zone)  0.08742*  0.08030 
West Zone (cf. South Zone)  0.00189  0.07078 
Tabia area (cf. South Zone)  0.00199*** -0.00145 
Constant -0.74437 -0.19051 
Number of observations 91   91 
   R-squared 0.28 0.32 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
1 All regression results are corrected for sampling stratification and weights, and standard 
errors are robust to hetroskedasticity and non-independence within the primary sampling 
units. 
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Annex : Summary statistics of variables used in regression 
Variable No of 
observatio
ns 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Proportion of households who invested in soil bunds 
(1991-1998) 
100 0.23 0.30 0 1 
Proportion of households who privately invested in SWC  
(1991-1998) 
100 0.52 0.30 0 1 
Proportion of households investing in tree plantation 
(1991-1998) 
100 0.58 0.36 0 1 
Change in proportion of households using compost 
between 1998 and 1991 
100 0.17 0.25 -0.80 0.90 
Change in proportion of households fallowing between 
1991 and 1998 
100 -0.07 0.13 -0.50 0.10 
Number of  land distribution in Tabia since 1974 100 3.58 1.12 1 6 
No of years since last land distribution in Tabia 100 8.84 2.53 1 19 
Number of landless households in Tabia in 1991 100 89.26 157.65 0 750 
Change in number of landless households (1991-1998) 100 160.60 168.65 -210 800 
If community felt very or moderately secure in 1991 100 0.80 0.40 0 1 
If land tenure security improved significantly (1998-
1991) 
100 0.16 0.37 0 1 
If land tenure security improved moderately (1998-1991) 100 0.66 0.48 0 1 
Average elevation (meters) 92 2003.04 297.21 1278.73 2725.14 
Average annual precipitation (mm) 92 641.10 85.57 501.37 870.5 
Change in proportion in households who are literate 
(1988-1991) 
88 0.34 0.12 -0.19 0.62 
Distance in market (walking minutes) 100 167.20 124.76 10 720 
Central Zone  100 0.34 0.47 0 1 
East Zone  100 0.24 0.43 0 1 
West Zone  100 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Area of tabia 98 57.24 35.24 12.30 179 
 
  
